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TURNING LEMONS INTO LEMONADE: UTILIZING
THE NAAQS PROVISIONS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT TO
COMPREHENSIVELY ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE
By Ari R. Lieberman*
INTRODUCTION
It is undeniable that anthropogenic global climate change is
occurring and needs to be addressed by the United States government.
Emissions from the United States contribute approximately 20% of
worldwide greenhouse gases (GHGs). Indeed, the buildup of GHGs
has already caused global warming with detrimental effects, and it
is predicted that emissions will continue to grow under a business as
usual scenario with warming increasing to dangerous levels that will
impact virtually every facet of life on this planet.
Congressional action to address climate change is
seemingly the preferable approach due to the multiple policy
considerations that must be taken into account to set GHG emission
goals. Furthermore, climate change should be addressed in a
comprehensive manner specifically tailored to the unique problems
posed by GHGs. However, as of this writing, it does not appear
that Congress will pass comprehensive legislation, thus leaving the
sole hope for government action with the executive branch through
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The good news is
that the EPA has the tools to address GHGs in a commonsense and
comprehensive manner through the Clean Air Act (CAA).I
* Ari R. Lieberman received a J.D. from Hofstra University School of Law and
an L.L.M in Environmental Law from New York University School Law. He cur-
rently practices law in New York, New York.
'As President Barack Obama said in his 2013 State of the Union address,
"[I]f Congress won't act soon to protect future generations [from climate change],
I will. I will direct my Cabinet to come up with executive actions we can take now
.... ." Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 2013
DAILY CONP. PREs. Doc. 2 (Feb. 12, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address (last vis-
ited Nov. 26, 2013).
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The EPA was initially hesitant to address climate change.2
It was not until the Supreme Court decision Massachusetts v. EPA,3
which ruled that GHGs are air pollutants for purposes of the CAA,
that the EPA finally began to act. Thus far, the focus of the EPA and
the Obama Administration has been to regulate GHGs at the source
of emissions. For example, the EPA issued a finding that GHGs
emitted from motor vehicles endanger health and welfare,' and,
accordingly, the EPA issued regulations limiting tailpipe emissions.'
Additionally, the EPA proposed regulations regarding stationary
sources pursuant to two sections of the CAA: the prevention of
significant deterioration (PSD) provisions6 and the new source
performance standards (NSPS) provisions.'
While regulating vehicles, power plants, and other sources
of emissions is a useful way to limit greenhouse gas emissions, such
regulations fail to guarantee overall reductions in a cost-effective
and flexible manner. Instead of conventional technology-based
standards, many have argued that the ideal way to target GHGs is
with market-based mechanisms, such as cap and trade programs or
2 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). On October 20, 1999, a group
of private organizations filed a rulemaking petition asking the EPA to regulate
greenhouse gases emitted from motor vehicles. Nearly four years later, the EPA
entered an order denying the rulemaking petition, arguing that the Clean Air Act
does not authorize the EPA to issue regulations in regards to climate change, and
even if the EPA had such authority, it would be unwise to do so.
I Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1) [hereinafter Endangerment Finding Under 202(a)].
5 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86 & 600, and 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533,
536 & 537).
6 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts 51, 52,
70 & 71) [hereinafter Tailoring Rule].
Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,476 (proposed May
4, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter Proposed NSPS Rule for
EGUs].
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a "carbon tax." While the popular argument among scholars is that
the NSPS provisions may allow some degree of emission trading,
an NSPS program would likely be limited in scope. Moreover,
programs that regulate only at the source, such as emission standards
for power plants or vehicles, would likely not take advantage of
state initiatives that have already been implemented, such as energy
efficiency programs, renewable portfolio standards, and state or
regional cap and trade programs. Furthermore, an NSPS program
would not provide incentives for various emitters that are not
"stationary sources," such as emissions from land use, agriculture
and large residential and commercial buildings. If there were a cap
on aggregate emissions, rather than only source-specific regulations,
industries and regulators would be allowed a greater degree of
flexibility while ensuring actual overall reductions.
This paper will argue that the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) provisions of the Clean Air Act provide
the needed tools to cap aggregate emissions. Under the NAAQS
provisions, the EPA is required to set a concentration in the ambient
air for "criteria pollutants" in order to protect human health and
welfare.' Thereafter, the states submit state implementation plans
(SIPs) in which they demonstrate how they will meet and maintain
the NAAQS. 9 By the express terms of the NAAQS provisions,
SIPs are allowed to incorporate economic incentives, including
marketable permits.10
The NAAQS provisions have received little attention as
a method to address climate change as the EPA and others have
consistently argued that NAAQS are not a suitable method for
addressing GHGs. However, many of the arguments against using
the NAAQS are overstated or no longer applicable. The typical
argument is that the NAAQS are "conceptually inconsistent" with
GHGs, since NAAQS have typically applied to local or regional
short-lived pollutants; whereas GHGs are global and remain in the
atmosphere for centuries. However, as explained in greater detail
below, the CAA provides the EPAwith the means to properly address
'See 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2011).
'See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2011).
"o See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (2011).
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GHGs through the NAAQS provisions in a manner that takes into
consideration the global long-lived nature of GHGs.
Another common argument against issuing a NAAQS for
GHGs is that it would trigger burdensome New Source Review
(NSR) permitting requirements. However, this argument is no longer
relevant since the EPAhas determined that the NSR provisions apply
regardless of whether NAAQS are established for GHGs. To curb
concerns that NSR will apply expansively to sectors not previously
subject to the permitting requirements, the EPA implemented the
"tailoring rule," which provides that only very large GHG emitters
are subject to NSR.
Despite the reluctance to rely on the NAAQS provisions
to address climate change, the EPA may not have the discretion
to refuse to issue a NAAQS for GHGs. The EPA may be legally
required to issue a NAAQS for GHGs due to the EPA's earlier finding
with respect to tailpipe emissions. Since the EPA determined that
emissions of GHGs from mobile sources is detrimental to health and
welfare, it is only logical that a similar endangerment finding should
be made with respect to the NAAQS provisions, thus resulting with
the EPA being mandated to issue a NAAQS.
This Article will argue that the NAAQS provisions allow the
EPA to regulate GHGs in a common sense manner that supports
market-based mechanisms and broad flexibility among the states.
This Article will consider that after setting NAAQS for GHGs, the
EPA can establish emission budgets for the states, and to satisfy a
portion of their necessary emission reductions to be in compliance,
states can opt into an EPA-created multi-sector cap and trade program.
While states may need to reduce emissions beyond the cap and trade
program to come within their budgets, they could be creative in the
ways they achieve reductions. States could successfully regulate
areas normally under state control, such as land use, building
standards, and agriculture. Such a design would implement flexible,
market-based mechanisms, address many sectors of the economy,
and take advantage of existing state laws that address GHGs.
The NAAQS provisions may allow the United States to take
significant steps in addressing climate change. Part I will discuss
the arguments against using the NAAQS to address GHGs posited
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by the EPA and others. Part II will argue that a focus on aggregate
emissions is a preferable approach in addressing GHGs, rather
than only reductions from specific sources. Part III will provide an
overview of how the NAAQS can be utilized to address aggregate
GHG emissions. This section will conclude with a discussion on
how the EPA can regulate GHGs, which are global long-lasting
pollutants, in a rational manner utilizing flexible market-based
policy mechanisms by establishing state budgets and a multi-sector
cap and trade program.
I. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST REGULATING THROUGH THE
NAAQS
The EPA, along with many commentators, industries and
even environmental groups, have advocated against using the
NAAQS provisions of the Clean Air Act to address greenhouse
gases." However, as will be discussed in greater detail below, many
of the concerns are either overstated or no longer applicable. Indeed,
since Congressional action to comprehensively address climate
change does not appear to be forthcoming, the NAAQS may provide
the EPA the necessary tools to reduce domestic emissions of GHG.
Contrary to what is often argued, the NAAQS provisions of the CAA
may allow the EPA to address climate change in a flexible manner,
taking advantage of market-based mechanisms and previously-
implemented state actions.
" Strengths and Weaknesses ofRegulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Using Ex-
isting Clean Air Act Authorities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and
Air Quality of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. (2008). For
example, John Dingell, representative from Michigan, stated that EPA regulation
of GHGs would be a "glorious mess." Id. at 13. See Control of Emissions from
New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, & 52,924 (EPA Sept.
8, 2003) (notice of denial of petition for rulemaking). Robert R. Nordhaus, New
Wine into Old Bottles: The Feasibility of Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the
CleanAirAct, 15 N.YU. ENVTL. L.J. 53, 61 (2007). See Nathan Richardson, PLAY-
ING WITHOUT ACES: OFFSETS AND THE LIMITS OF FLEXIBILITY UNDER CLEAN AIR ACT
CLIMATE POLICY, 30 (2011) [hereinafter Richardson (2011)] ("[T]he mainstream
view held by the agency, industry, and most environmental groups appears to
be that a NAAQS for GHGs is the wrong approach, both politically and practi-
cally.").
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In the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA, it became apparent that
the EPA might be forced to regulate GHGs through various sources
since many provisions of the CAA "trigger" responsibilities under
other provisions. For example, as will be discussed in greater below,
since the EPAbegan regulating GHG emissions from motor vehicles,
the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) provisions that
apply to stationary sources are triggered. Moreover, arguably the
"endangerment findings" with respect to GHG emissions from
motor vehicles trigger a similar finding with respect to the NAAQS
provisions. In 2008, the EPA issued an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPR) to discuss and elicit comments on the ways in
which the EPA could regulate GHGs through the CAA, if at all. 12 As
the introduction to the ANPR demonstrates, the EPA was hesitant to
regulate GHGs through the CAA, and would prefer Congressional
action:
[T]he ANPR demonstrates the Clean Air Act, an
outdated law originally enacted to control regional
pollutants that cause direct health effects, is ill-suited
for the task of regulating global greenhouse gases.
Based on the analysis to date, pursuing this course of
action would inevitably result in a very complicated,
time-consuming and, likely, convoluted set of
regulations.13
12 The ANPR took an atypical approach of not only requesting information and
stating the EPA viewpoint, but it also included statements from the Office of
Management and Budget, four Cabinet Departments (Agriculture, Commerce,
Transportation and Energy), the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Qual-
ity, the Director of the President's Office of Science and Technology Policy, the
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Chief Counsel for Advo-
cacy at the Small Business Administration, each of which advocated against regu-
lating GHGs under the Clean Air Act. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 & 44,356-96 (Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking July 30, 2008) [hereinafter ANPR]; see also LARRY PARKER
AND JAMEs E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40585, CLIMATE CHANGE: Po-
TENTIAL REGULATION OF STATIONARY GREENHOUSE GAS SOURCES UNDER THE CLEAN
AIR ACT, 3-4 (2009).
13 ANPR, supra note 12, at 44,355.
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The NAAQS provisions, in particular, are often viewed
as conceptually inconsistent with regulating GHGs. In general,
the basis of this viewpoint is that the NAAQS were designed for
local or regional short-lived pollutants and not global long-lasting
pollutants, such as carbon dioxide. This argument was summed up in
the EPA's initial determination in 2003, prior to the Supreme Court
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, that the EPA lacked the authority
to regulate GHGs. This 2003 determination was based in large part
on the conclusion that the NAAQS were ill-suited since GHGs are a
global pollutant and:
[A]ny C02 standard that might be established
would in effect be a worldwide ambient air quality
standard, not a national standard - the entire world
would be either in compliance or out of compliance.
... The globally pervasive nature of C02 emissions
and atmospheric concentrations presents a unique
problem that fundamentally differs from the kind of
environmental problem that the NAAQS system was
intended to address and is capable of solving. 14
The EPA argued in the ANPR that NAAQ S are inappropriate
due to the fact that traditional criteria pollutants are typically short-
lived and regional in nature, and GHGs stay in the atmosphere for
a long period of time and are global pollutants." Moreover, the
concentration of GHGs is generally uniform throughout the nation
and the world. Accordingly, depending on the concentration that the
NAAQS are set, the entire country would either be in attainment or
nonattainment of the NAAQ S.16 Furthermore, due to the well-mixed,
uniform and long-lasting nature of GHGs emissions, reductions in a
single state or region would likely have no appreciable impact on the
' Memorandum from Robert E. Frabricant, EPA General Counsel, to Marianne L.
Horinco, EPA Acting Administrator, EPA's Authority to Impose Mandatory Con-
trols to Address Global Climate Change Under the Clean Air Act, at 7-8 (Aug.
28, 2003).
' ANPR, supra note 12, at 44,408.
161d. at 44,480.
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atmospheric concentration level in the particular state or region."
The rationale against issuing a NAAQS for GHGs, according to
the EPA's argument, is that no single state would be able to meet
the NAAQS, since reductions within a single state will never be
sufficient to reduce concentrations of GHGs enough to come within
the NAAQs.s Additionally, approximately 75 % of GHG emissions
are beyond the control of the United States, and accordingly SIPs
would not be able to address these emissions.19
However, while GHGs may be conceptually different than
traditional criteria pollutants for purposes of regulation under
NAAQS, GHGs are not necessarily conceptually incompatible with
a NAAQS program. In this regard, while it is unusual for the entire
nation to be in either in attainment or nonattainment of the NAAQS,
such a scenario does not render the NAAQS provisions inoperable.
As will be discussed in greater detail below, the CAA includes
provisions, namely sections 179B and the "good neighbor provision,"
that arguably allow the EPA to regulate GHGs in a common-sense
manner, taking into account the global nature of GHGs. In brief,
section 179B allows state plans implementing the NAAQS to be
approved if the reason the state is in nonattainment is international
emissions,2 and the "good neighbor" provision prohibits states to
interfere with other state's achieving the NAAQS and has been
interpreted to allow the EPA to issue state budgets and cap and trade
programs.21 Moreover, the EPA could take into consideration the
long-lasting nature of GHGs by only issuing a secondary NAAQS for
GHGs, which protects welfare including changes in the weather and
climate and allows states to come in compliance "as expeditiously
as practicable,"22 rather than a primary health-based NAAQS, which
would require compliance within ten years.2 3
"See id. at 44,401.
'
8 d. at 44,483.
' Nordhaus, supra note 11, at 62; DAVID SCHOENBROD, RICHARD B. STEWART &
KATRINA M. WYMAN, BREAKING THE LOGJAM 61(2012).
2042 U.S.C. § 7509a (2006).; North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
2 1See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (2006).
2242 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(2)(B) (2006).
2342 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(2)(A) (2006).
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A separate common argument against using the NAAQS
provisions proffered in the ANPR and elsewhere is that NAAQS
regulation will trigger burdensome New Source Review (NSR)
regulations. Depending on where the NAAQS are set for GHGs
and whether the entire country is in attainment or nonattainment,
permitting requirements would be triggered for new and modified
sources, known as new source review (NSR).2 4 If the country were in
attainment, then prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) rules
would apply,2 5 and if the country were in nonattainment, then more
stringent NSR rules would apply.26 Importantly, the NSR provisions
apply to stationary sources that emit or have the potential to emit
more than 100 or 250 tons per year of conventional pollutants,
depending on the type of source, of a given pollutant per year.27
Many sources that do not emit 100 or 250 tons per year emit GHGs
in excess of the statutory amount. Accordingly, if NSR applied to
GHGs, then many sources not previously covered by NSR, such as
schools, hospitals and large apartment and office buildings, would
need to obtain permits.28
While it may very well be a "regulatory nightmare"2 9 if all
new and modified sources that emit 100 or 250 tons per year of
GHGs required permits, such a scenario is a possibility regardless
of a NAAQS program for GHGs. Indeed, it has been the EPA's
long-held stance that PSD permitting rules apply once a pollutant
is regulated under the CAA, regardless of whether the pollutant is
a "criteria pollutant."3 0 In this regard, section 165(a)(4) states that
PSD rules apply and major facilities must install control technology
2 4See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7503 (2006).
25 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2006).
2642 U.S.C. § 7503 (2006).
27 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1).
28 Schoenbrod, supra note 19, at 60.
29 See Peter Glaser, Avoiding a Regulatory Nightmare, 26:2 Envtl. F. 52 (March
2009).
30 Tailoring Rule, supra note 6; see also Reconsideration of Interpretation of
Regulations that Detennine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Pro-
grams, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Final Action on Reconsideration of Interpretation
Apr. 2, 2010).
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"for each pollutant subject to regulation."3 1 Since the EPA has
already issued regulations for motor vehicles under Title 11, GHGs
are "subject to regulation" and PSD rules were triggered.3 2
To address the regulatory burden of requiring permits for
vastly more sources of emissions, the EPA issued a "tailoring rule,"
which provided that only very large sources, those emitting 75,000
or 100,000 tons per year of GHGs, would initially be subject to PSD
permitting requirements.3 3 In the "tailoring rule," the EPA relied
on the "absurd results" doctrine and the "administrative necessity"
doctrine to argue that if the 100/250 tons per year threshold applied
to GHGs, regulators would be dramatically overburdened.34 The
"tailoring rule" was challenged in the D.C. Circuit by a group of
states and industry associations.3 5 However, the court dismissed the
challenge on standing grounds since the rule actually favored the
petitioners by making the regulation less burdensome.3 6
The "tailoring rule," or a similar future NSR rule, should
the country be in nonattainment, may be prone to a legal challenge.
Indeed, the rule is in clear contradiction to the statutory language
that defines a "major emitting facility" as one that emits either
100 or 250 tons per year of a covered pollutant.37 In order for a
court to reach the merits, however, the rule must be challenged by
petitioners with standing such as a state that is concerned about
climate change38 or an environmental group - neither of which are
likely forthcoming. A state would likely refrain from opposing the
"tailoring rule" since it would create more burdensome regulations
should the "tailoring rule" be overturned. Moreover, environmental
groups might not challenge the "tailoring rule" since they may be
worried that congressional action in response to a decision rejecting
the "tailoring rule" would include stripping the EPA of the power to
3142 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4).32 Tailoring Rule, supra note 6 at 31518.
33 1d. at 31516, 31533.
34 Id. at 31516.
35 Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
361d.
3742 U.S.C. § 7479(1).
38See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518 (holding that state petitioners have
standing).
TURNING LEMONS INTO LEMONADE
regulate GHGs altogether. Importantly, if a court struck down the
"tailoring rule," then the same outcome would occur whether or not
NAAQS were established; all facilities that emit 100 or 250 tons per
year of GHGs would be subject to NSR requirements.
Even if a court overturned the "tailoring rule," or a similar
rule for nonattainment NSR, Congress may choose to take the less
severe action of stripping authority from the EPA to regulate GHGs.
As suggested by some commentators, all Congress would need to do
is make a slight modification to the language in the CAA and simply
change the threshold for GHGs in the NSR rules.39 Even without
congressional action, the EPA may be able to address the issue by
allowing universal or general permits for small sources.4 0
The two chief arguments against relying on the NAAQS
provisions to address GHGs are overstated or inapplicable. Indeed,
as will be shown in greater detail in Part III, the CAA allows the EPA
to take into account the global nature of GHGs, and, accordingly,
the CAA can regulate GHGs in a rational manner. Furthermore, the
concerns that the NAAQS will trigger NSR are overstated since
NSR is triggered already, since the EPA is regulating GHGs under
the motor vehicle provision of the Clean Air Act. 41 To address the
concerns of unduly burdensome regulations, the EPA drafted the
"tailoring rule." The ANPR and many of the commentators that
argue against regulating GHGs through the NAAQS were written
prior to the "tailoring rule," and accordingly do not consider that
the EPA has already addressed the concerns of out-of-control NSR
regulations.
39 See Nathan Richardson, Art Fraas, & Dallas Burtraw, Greenhouse Gas Regula-
tion Under the Clean Air Act: Structure, Effects, and Implications of a Knowable
Pathway, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWs & ANALYSIs 10098, 10100 (2010) (hereinafter
Richardson (2010)).
4 Christopher T. Giovinazzo, Defending Overstatement: The Symbolic Clean Air
Act and Carbon Dioxide, 30 HARv. ENvTL. L. REV. 99, 157 (2006); Larry Parker &
James E. McCarthy, Climate Change: Potential Regulation ofStationary Green-
house Gas Sources Under the Clean Air Act, CONG. RESEARCH SRVs., R40585, 26
(May 14, 2009) (notes that the Clean Air Act, section 504(d), allows the EPA to
issue a "general permit" covering all sources within the same category).
4 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts 51, 52,
70 & 71) [hereinafter Tailoring Rule].
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF ADDRESSING AGGREGATE EMISSIONS
Thus far the policy of the United States and the EPA to
reduce GHG emissions is by setting emission standards for specific
sources. The EPA set tailpipe emissions reduction targets via Title II
of the Clean Air Act and proposed standards of performance for new
or modified electricity-generating units through the New Source
Performance Standards (NSPS) provisions. Seemingly, the EPA will
continue to issue further regulations for additional categories of new
and modified stationary sources, such as petroleum refineries, as well
as begin to address existing stationary sources. Such regulations may
reduce GHG emissions, and may even phase out the construction of
new coal-fired power plants; however, source-specific technology-
based performance standards will not guarantee that overall emission
reductions are realized, since, at least theoretically, emissions can
continue to increase outside of the regulated entities. Indeed, the
only method to ensure that overall reductions will be met is to put a
cap on overall aggregate emissions. A cap on overall emissions will
allow reductions from various areas that would be outside a source-
specific approach. For example, regulations concerning energy
efficiency, building design, land use, city planning, and agriculture
would assist in reducing overall emissions, yet would all be outside
the scope of a source-specific approach.
As will be discussed in greater detail in Part III, the NAAQS
provisions of the Clean Air Act may provide the EPA with the tools
to set a cap on overall emissions of GHGs. Significantly, even if
the United States were to utilize the NAAQS provisions for GHGs,
NSPS regulations for new or modified stationary sources and Title
II regulations for motor vehicles would nevertheless be required
for sources of GHGs. Many have argued that the NSPS provisions
will allow at least some degree of flexibility in its implementation.
However, as will be argued below, the NSPS provisions alone do not
provide the same degree of flexibility, nor do they consider as many
sectors of the economy, as a NAAQS approach. Moreover, while the
EPA is currently attempting to avoid issuing NAAQS for GHGs, this
decision may not be within their discretion.
TURNING LEMONS INTO LEMONADE
A. An Overview of NSPS
Pursuant to the new source performance standards (NSPS)
provisions in section 111 of the CAA, the Administrator is charged
with creating a list of categories of stationary sources that causes or
contributes to air pollution that endangers public health or welfare.42
Thereafter, a "standard of performance" is issued for each category,
which is defined as "a standard for emissions of air pollutants which
reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the
application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking
into account... cost [and other factors]).. .the Administrator shall
determine whether it has been adequately demonstrated."4 3 Setting
a "standard of performance" typically involves identifying a control
technology and developing performance standards based on the
selected technology. 44 While the EPA often bases the standard of
performance on a specific technology, the sources are not forced
to implement the technology; rather, the standard of performance
is usually reflected as a numerical emissions limit that the given
category of sources must meet.45
Section 111(b) requires new or modified sources to install
emission reduction technologies. 46 Additionally, pursuant to section
111(d), the EPA establishes a procedure for states to submit plans
that establish standards of performance for existing sources.4 7 Under
section 111(d), the EPA issues guidelines to the states regarding
systems of reduction and the states submit plans, subject to EPA
approval, for implementation of the guidelines. 48 However, the EPA
4242 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A).
4342 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
**42 U.S.C. § 7411(b); 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (a)(1); Richardson (2010), supra note
39, at 10107.
11 See Jonas Monast, Tim Profeta, Brooks Rainey Pearson & John Doyle, Regulat-
ing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Sources: Section 111(d) and State
Equivalency, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. 10206, 10207 (2012).
46 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)
4742 U.S.C. § 7411(d).
4842 U.S.C. § 7411(d).
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is only authorized to issue guidelines for existing sources as long
as the pollutant is not regulated under the NAAQS provisions nor
listed as a hazardous air pollutant.49
As a result of a settlement agreement between states and
environmental groups, on January 8, 2014, the EPA proposed GHG
NSPS for Electric Generating Units (EGUs).s0 The NSPS regulations
require new large fossil fuel-fired EGUs to meet an output-based
standard of 1,000 or 1,100 pounds of C02 per megawatt-hour
depending on the size and type of unit. This standard is based on
the emissions rate of natural gas powered EGUs. Indeed, coal-
fired power plants typically have an emissions rate well above the
1,100 pounds of C02 per megawatt-hour standard." Thus, unless
carbon storage and sequestration technology can be built to scale,
the rules virtually prohibit the construction of new coal-fired power
plants.52 While the proposed regulations are solely for new sources,53
pursuant to 111(d) the EPA may be required in the future to establish
a procedure for states to regulate existing sources as well.54
*42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1)(A)(i).
50 Richardson (2011), supra at 4; Settlement Agreements to Address Greenhouse
Gas Emissions from Electric Generating Units and Refineries: Fact Sheet, avail-
able at http://epa.gov/carbonpollutionstandard/pdfs/settlementfactsheet.pdf (last
visited Aug. 26, 2013); Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
From New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg.
1429 (proposed Jan. 8, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 60). The 2013 proposed
standards withdrew standards that were proposed on April 13, 2012. The 2012
standards relied on a single standard for all new fossil-fuel electricity generating
units, whereas the 2013 rule has different standards depending on size and type of
unit. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Station-
ary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 07820 (proposed Apr.
13, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
" Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Proposed Standards of Performance for
Greenhouse Gas Emissionsfor New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generat-
ing Units, EPA-452/R-12-001, at 5-21 (March 2012). The emissions rate for coal-
fired power plants is approximately 1,800 pounds of C02 per megawatt-hour.
52 See generally Comments from Edison Electric Institute to EPA on Standards of
Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissionsfor New Stationary Sources: Electric
Generating Units (June 25, 2012).
53 Id.
5'42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(A).
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The proposed NSPS regulations do not allow trading
between sources. Since trading is not allowed, stationary sources see
no benefit of reducing emissions below the standard of performance.
On the other hand, if emission trading were allowed, sources would
be incentivized to reduce emissions below the standard that would
generate credits that the source could sell to other sources that emit
above the standard. Currently, the only incentive in the regulations
is for new coal-fired power plants to install carbon capture and
sequestration technology or to switch entirely to natural gas. There
is no benefit for sources to switch to renewables that have no
emissions, rather than switching to natural gas, since either method
will allow the source to be in compliance with the proposed rules.
According to the EPA, the proposed regulations will have
negligible costs, since it assumes that even without the regulations
no new coal plants would be built.5 5 This assumption is troubling
for a number of reasons. As an initial matter, the regulations, by the
EPA's own admission, do nothing to halt emissions other than what
would be occurring under a business-as-usual scenario. Moreover,
the regulations assume that natural gas will remain a cheap resource.
However, while natural gas has seen a boon in recent years, that may
change if controversial natural gas extraction techniques, known as
hydraulic fracturing, become more heavily regulated. 56 As of now,
the regulation of hydraulic fracturing is largely left to the states, with
little federal oversight.5 7 This may change in the future, especially
5 Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Proposed Standards of Performance for
Greenhouse Gas Emissionsfor New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generat-
ing Units, EPA-452/R-12-001, at 5-1 (March 2012); see also Standards of Per-
formance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1429 (proposed Jan. 8, 2014) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. 60).
56 See Comments from Edison Electric Institute to EPA on Standards of Perfor-
mance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary Sources: Electric Gen-
erating Units (June 25, 2012) ("Many factors will affect the future price and sup-
ply of shale gas, including state and federal regulations that have not yet been
finalized.").
See, e.g., Jacquelyn Pless, States Take the Lead on Regulating Hydraulic Frac-
turing: Overview of 2012 State Legislation, Nat'l Conference of State Legisla-
tures (March 2013).
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since the EPA is undergoing a multi-year study of the effects of
hydraulic fracturing," and depending on the results of this study, the
federal government may determine that more oversight is necessary.
If additional regulations are put in place, the price of natural gas will
likely rise.
B. Can NSPS Utilize Flexible Market-Based Mechanisms?
As stated above, currently the administration has only
proposed NSPS regulations for new or modified sources. However,
President Obama has indicated in a speech on June 25, 2013,
that his administration is planning to regulate existing sources as
well. 59 Since existing coal-fired power plants continue to emit large
amounts of carbon dioxide, it is important that such sources reduce
emissions. Since, as mentioned above, it is likely that no new coal-
fired power plants would be built even without EPA action, it is
important that regulations are implemented that address existing
stationary sources.
Many commentators believe that the EPA is allowed to
pursue flexible market-based mechanisms through the NSPS
provisions, especially in regards to existing sources through section
111(d). As discussed above, pursuant to the NSPS provisions, the
EPA sets "standards of performance" for categories of sources
which is defined as the "emission limitation achievable through
the best system of emission reduction..."60 While the term "best
system of emission reduction" has traditionally been interpreted as
technological systems of reduction at the actual source, if the term
can be interpreted broadly to mean that the EPA-created program is
the "system of emissions reduction," the EPA could arguably create
a program with compliance flexibilities, including trading between
58EPA 's Study ofHydraulic Fracturing and its Potential Impact on Drinking Water
Resources, available at http://www2.epa.gov/hfstudy (last visited Aug. 26, 2013).
5 9Remarks by the President on Climate Change (June 25, 2013) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/remarks-president-cli-
mate-change (last visited Aug. 26, 2013).
60 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
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sources of the same category.6 1 There is little precedent, however, for
an emission-trading program under the NSPS provisions. The EPA
attempted to create such a program with the Clean Air Mercury Rule
(CAMR), 62 but the D.C. Circuit invalidated the rule on the grounds
that the EPA improperly delisted mercury as a hazardous pollutant.
Accordingly, the court did not rule on the legality of the trading
program, and the ability for the EPA to create a trading program
through NSPS remains largely untested. 63
Some commentators find evidence that an NSPS program for
existing sources can incorporate flexible market-based compliance
mechanisms in the reference to the SIP procedure contained in
section 111(d).64 Under section 111(d), the EPAAdministrator "shall
establish a procedure similar to.. .section 7410 [110].. .which each
state shall submit to the Administrator a plan..." to meet the emission
reductions targets set by the EPA for existing sources.65 Section 110,
in turn, expressly allows state plans that implement the NAAQS,
to include "economic incentives such as ... marketable permits, and
auctions of emissions rights." 66 Accordingly, some argue that state
plans for existing sources under NSPS allow market mechanisms in
a "similar" manner to section 110 state implementation plans.67
Others argue, however, that an NSPS program requires
emission reductions from each facility, and, thus, no trading would
be available. As an initial matter, the reference to section 110 merely
states that the "procedure" in which the EPA issues guidelines and
the states submit plans for existing sources under 111(d) is "similar"
6 1See generally Gregory E. Wannier, Jason A. Schwartz, Nathan Richardson, Mi-
chael A. Livermore, Michael B. Gerrard, and Dallas Burtraw, "Prevailing Aca-
demic View on Compliance Flexibility under 111 of the Clean Air Act" RFF DP
11-29 (July 2011) (majority of scholars believe such a definition is possible); see
Richardson (2010), supra; some argue that such an interpretation by the EPA will
be granted deference by a court. See, e.g., Richardson (2011) supra at 20 citing
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
62 See Wannier et al., supra at 5; Richardson (2011), supra.
63 New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
64 Wannier et al., supra at 5.
65 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (d).
66 Wannier et al., supra at 5.
67 See Richardson (2011), supra at 15; Wannier et al., supra at 5
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to the SIP procedure in section 110.68 Thus, section 111(d) is silent
with regards to whether the substance of a section 110 SIP, including
"economic incentives" and market approaches, can be included in
NSPS state plans. The reference to section 110 may simply mean
that the procedure in which the EPA sets guidelines and the states
devise plans, subject to EPA approval, is similar for section 111(d).
Moreover, the phrase "best system of emission reduction" has
traditionally applied to technological systems in facilities, rather
than an overarching program such as a trading regime.69 To consider
a trading regime to be a "system of emission reduction" for purposes
of 111(d) may be stretching its meaning to the breaking point.
Accordingly, a court may very well invalidate a trading scheme
implemented under 111(d).
Even if a trading program were allowed under the NSPS
provisions, the extent and flexibility would likely be limited. In this
regard, even if "system of emission reduction" is defined broadly
to include a trading program, trading across different categories
of sources will likely be prohibited." Indeed, the language of the
68See Richardson (2011), supra at 16.
69 See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Energy
and Air Quality of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. 11-14
(2008) (statement of Lisa Heinzerling, Professor of Law, Georgetown University
Law Center); see also Asarco v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (held that
EPA was prevented from "bubbling" multiple facilities to be considered since
source). However, Asarco may not be applicable because it focused on the term
"source," rather than "system of reduction" and the case was decided before
Chevron v. NRDC, thus the EPA did not have same degree of deference as they
would currently enjoy.
7o See Patricia Ross McCubbin, Cap and Trade Programs Under the Clean Air
Act: Lessons from the Clean Air Interstate Rule and the NOx SIP Call, 18 PENN
ST. ENVT'L L. REv. 2, 22-23 (Fall 2009) (". . . EPA is exploring the possibility of
implementing a cap and trade program for certain facilities that emit greenhouse
gases [under the NSPS section]. That provision does not expressly authorize
emissions trading, and many states and environmental organizations believe such
a program fundamentally conflicts with the section 111 scheme, which generally
imposes the same emissions standards on all members of an industrial group ....
As a result ... the court would likely restrict the Agency's ability to establish a
cap and trade program under section 111 . . . .").
See generally Richardson (2011), supra; see generally Monast et al., supra.
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CAA requires the EPA to define categories of sources and create
"standards of performance... within such category." 2 Thus, it is
conceivable that the EPA could create an emissions trading program
for electricity-generating units (EGUs), for example. However,
EGUs would not be able to trade emissions credits with sources from
another category, such as petroleum refineries. The EPA arguably
has the ability to redefine categories broadly enough to encompass
multiple sources that would ordinarily be in separate categories.
For example, a category may be defined as all stationary sources
that emit a certain amount of GHGs, such that EGUs and petroleum
refineries would be in the same category and thus able to trade with
each other.73 However, there is no precedent for such redefinition of
categories.7 4 Moreover, fossil-fuel powered EGUs may be limited in
trading with renewable sources that do not emit greenhouse gases
since renewable sources would, arguably, not be covered under the
NSPS provisions, and thus outside the scope of the trading regime.
In this regard, renewable energy sources, for instance wind farms,
would not be "stationary sources" pursuant to section 111, since
they do not emit air pollutants." Accordingly, a wind farm would
not receive any credits under an NSPS trading program for emitting
less than the emission standard, and there would be no incentive for
the creation of new wind farms in the NSPS program.
Additionally, it is highly unlikely that an NSPS program
could allow offsets from uncovered sources. Even if "system of
emission reduction" was defined broadly to include trading and
EPA redefined categories of sources to include multiple sectors, it
still remains unlikely that sources will be able to receive credits
from reductions other than directly from those directly from the
stationary sources.76 Generally, offsets reduce the overall costs of
a trading program by allowing covered sources to receive credits
if they secure emissions reductions from uncovered sources. Thus,
a covered source under a trading program could either reduce its
7242 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A)-(B).
73Richardson (2011), supra at 17-18.
41d.
71See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3).
76Richardson (2011), supra at 21-22; Wannier et al., supra at 9.
2013-2014] 19
20 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21
own emissions, buy allowances from other covered sources, or pay
an uncovered source to lower their emissions and receive offset
credits for such reductions. Such a system, however, would likely
be unavailable under an NSPS program. For example, it would
be impermissible for an EGU to meet the required performance
standard by emission reductions taking place at a farm. Accordingly,
even if NSPS regulations allowed trading, the scope would likely be
limited to inter-category trading, and offsets would almost certainly
not be allowable.
Lastly, even an NSPS regime that incorporated flexible
market-based mechanisms, such as trading between sources, would
nevertheless leave many sources of GHG emissions uncovered.
Even if the EPA incorporated most large stationary sources into
an NSPS program, a significant portion of GHGs-almost 50%-
would remain outside of the program. As discussed above, an NSPS
trading regime would likely not allow trading between fossil-fueled
powered EGUs and renewable energy EGUs. Furthermore, any
other emissions that do not come from stationary sources that emit
pollutants are uncovered. For example, evidence demonstrates that
large amounts of methane are released during hydraulic fracturing
practices to extract natural gas. However, the fugitive methane
emissions from natural gas extraction would be outside the scope of
the NSPS regime since the hydraulic fracturing operations are not
conducted at the "stationary source." Accordingly, while coal-fired
power plants emit more GHGs than natural gas-fired plants, since
the methane emissions would likely remain completely outside the
scope of the NSPS regime, it is unclear if NSPS regulations that
limit coal and support natural gas will be as successful in reducing
emissions as currently claimed. Furthermore, emissions that occur
due to urban sprawl, deforestation and other land use would be outside
the scope of the NSPS regime, and low priced-methods to sequester
carbon through reforestation and agricultural soil sequestration
would not be incentivized under an NSPS program." Additionally,
building standards and most agricultural operations will likewise
Nordhaus, supra note 11, at 69.
"Richardson (2011), supra at 27.
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not be covered under an NSPS program.7 9 However, if the focus
of the EPA action were on overall aggregate emissions, rather than
emissions at specific sources, then any source of emissions, whether
it is at a farm, due to urban sprawl, or from a large power plant, can
be under a single regime. Thus, there will be incentives to reduce
GHG emissions no matter the source of said emissions.
C. Regulation of Existing Sources through NSPS May Be
Barred
The CAA only allows the EPA to address existing sources
under an NSPS program when the air pollutant at issue is not a
criteria pollutant under 108(a) or a hazardous pollutant under 112.0
When a pollutant is listed as a criteria pollutant under 108(a), the
EPA must issue NAAQS for the subject pollutant." Accordingly, the
EPA will be prohibited from regulating GHGs from existing sources
under an NSPS program if GHGs are regulated under the NAAQS. 82
Significantly, the EPA may be legally bound to issue NAAQS for
GHGs, and, thus would be unable to regulate existing sources under
an NSPS program.
Section 108(a) of the CAA dictates when the EPA must issue
NAAQS. The section states:
(1) For the purpose of establishing national primary
and secondary ambient air quality standards, the
Administrator shall.. publish... a list which includes
each air pollutant
(A) emissions of which, in his judgment, cause or
contribute to air pollution which may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare;
1Id. at 17; 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (NSP only
covers large stationary sources of emissions).
8042 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1)(a)(i).
842 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1)(A).82However, the EPA could continue to regulate new and modified sources under
NSPS even if the EPA regulates GHGs through the NAAQS. Compare 42 U.S.C.
§ 7411(b), with 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d).
2013-2014] 21
22 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21
(B) the presence of which in the ambient air results
from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary
sources; and
(C) for which the air quality criteria had not been
issued before December 31, 1970 but for which he
plans to issue air quality criteria under this section.
It is clear that GHGs meet subsection (B) since they are
emitted from "numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources."
Moreover, subsection (A) is likely met too. In this regard, the EPA
has already issued an "endangerment finding" for GHGs with respect
to mobile sources.83 The "endangerment" language contained in
section 202(a) is virtually identical to the language contained in
subsection (A) of 108.84 Since GHGs "endanger public health or
welfare" when emitted from motor vehicles for purposes of section
202(a), then it is logical that the pollutants also "endanger public
health and welfare" when emitted from "numerous or diverse mobile
or stationary sources" for purposes of section 108."
The EPA maintains that, notwithstanding GHGs meet
subsections (A) and (B), the agency retains discretion whether or
not to issue NAAQS for GHGs.8 6 It is argued that subsection (C),
which states that NAAQS are to be issued for pollutants "which [the
Administrator] plans to issue air quality criteria," provides the EPA
with discretion." Thus if the Administrator does not "plan to issue
83 
"Endangerment Finding Under 202(a)," supra note 4.
"*Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a), with 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a). 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)
states that "The Administrator shall ... prescribe ... standards applicable to the
emission of any air pollutant from ... new motor vehicles ... which in his judg-
ment, cause or contribute to, air pollution, which may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 752 1(a).
15Even if the previous endangerment finding does not compel a similar endanger-
ment finding for section 108(a)(1)(A), it certainly "offers compelling evidence
that cannot be ignored." See McCubbin, supra at 112.
86 See, e.g., Nathan Richardson, "Greenhouse Gas Regulation under the Clean Air
Act: Does Chevron v. NRDC Set the EPA Free" RFF DP 09-50, 10 (Dec. 2009)
(hereinafter "Richardson (2009)"); ANPR, supra note 12, at 44,477.
17As the EPA stated, "...this third criterion could provide EPA discretion to decide
whether to list those pollutants under section 108 for purposes of regulating them
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air quality criteria" for GHGs, then it is irrelevant that subsections
(A) and (B) have been met, and no NAAQS will need to be issued.
The Second Circuit in NRDC v. Train" was the only court
to render an opinion on whether the EPA has discretion to issue
NAAQS following an endangerment finding. The EPA sought to
avoid setting a NAAQS regime for lead, despite previously issuing
an endangerment finding under section 211, which covers fuels and
fuel additives, and claimed that it had discretion under subsection
(C).8 9 The Second Circuit, however, rejected the EPA's argument,
and opined that the legislative history and the text of the statute,
including the refrain that EPA "shall... publish...a list," dictate that
the EPA lacks discretion when subsections (A) and (B) are met, and
the EPA must list the pollutant and issue NAAQS.9 0
Although this reading of the statute has not been subsequently
challenged, the EPA continues to believe that it has discretion to
decline to issue NAAQS for GHGs.9 1 The EPA argues that Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,92 which was decided after NRDC v. Train,
gives the EPA greater latitude in interpreting ambiguous statutes,
and a court would find an interpretation of subsection (C) that
allowed the EPA to exercise reasonable discretion.93 In this regard,
the landmark Supreme Court decision in Chevron incorporated
a two-part test, which first asks whether Congress spoke directly
to a given issue, and if so then the agency must give effect to the
unambiguous direction from Congress. However, if the statute was
silent or ambiguous with respect to a given issue, then the agency's
interpretation will be upheld if it was a permissible construction of
the statute.94 Additionally, amendments to the CAA guarantee that a
challenge now would be heard in the D.C. Circuit,95 rather than the
via the NAAQS." ANPR, supra note 12, at 44,477.
88 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976).
891d.
9o See id.; see also Richardson (2009), supra at 16-18.
91ANPR, supra note 12, at 44,477.
92467 U.S. 837 (1984).
93 ANPR, supra note 12, at 44,477.
9 Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843-843 (1984).
9542 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).
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Second Circuit, and accordingly NRDC v. Train would only have
persuasive authority, rather than precedential.9 6
Despite Chevron, however, a court may follow NRDC v.
Train and hold that the EPA does not have discretion to refuse to
issue NAAQS following an endangerment finding. In this regard, the
court in NRDC v. Train based its holding on canons of construction,
including legislative history, the canon against surplusage, and the
canon to find meaning based on the structure of the statute, which
has been used by courts since Chevron to determine that a statute
was unambiguous.97 Accordingly, a court could use the same canons
of construction used in NRDC v. Train to determine that the statute is
not ambiguous and if sections (A) and (B) are met, then the EPA must
list GHGs as a criteria pollutant.9 8 Importantly, if the EPA is legally
96See Richardson (2009), supra at 19.
9 Richardson (2009), supra at 22-23; see also Immigration and Naturalization
Serv. v. Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987) (stating that "traditional tools
of statutory construction" allow a reviewing court to determine whether a statute
is ambiguous); Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter for Comtys for a Great Or., 515
U.S. 687, 704 (1995) (holding indicates that legislative history supports agency's
interpretation); While the court in NRDC v. Train stated that the statute was "am-
biguous," this statement had a different meaning prior to Chevron then it does to-
day, and likely would not have any precedential effect requiring a Step 2 analysis.
9
" [T]he EPA very likely be forced by its 202 Endangerment Finding to issue a
similar finding under 108, which will then trigger regulation of GHGs under the
NAAQS framework detailed under 109-110." Richardson (2009), supra at 10.
Additionally, one commentator argued that the language in section 108 suggesting
that the EPA retains discretion is due to a Scrivener's error. See generally Patri-
cia Ross McCubbin, EPA & Endangerment Finding for Greenhouse Gases and
the Potential Duty to Adopt National Ambient Air Quality Standards to Address
Global Climate Change, 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 437 (2009) (symposium contribution).
McCubbin argued that section 108 appears to have contradicting requirements
since it contains the mandatory command that the EPA "shall.. publish.. .a list,"
as well as discretionary language if the EPA doesn't "plan to issue air quality cri-
teria." McCubbin argued that the legislative history, however, demonstrates that
such discretion was unintended by citing to a Senate Report which provided that
EPA would list and regulate "all those pollution agents or combinations ofagents
which have, or can be expected to have, an adverse effect on health and welfare
and which are emittedfrom widely distributed mobile and stationary sources, and
all those for which air quality criteria are planned." S. Rep. No. 91-1197, Report
of the Committee on Public Works United States Senate Together with Individual
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required to list GHGs as a criteria pollutant and issue a NAAQS,
then any work establishing a program for existing sources pursuant
to section 111(d) would be for naught since the EPA is prohibited
from regulating sources under 111(d) for criteria pollutants.
III. REGULATION OF GHGs THROUGH THE NAAQS
As discussed above, one method to regulate GHGs in a
comprehensive and flexible manner that takes advantage of market-
based mechanisms is to put a cap on overall aggregate emissions.
Moreover, as demonstrated above, the EPA may be legally required
to issue a NAAQS for GHGs due to its prior endangerment finding.
Luckily, the EPA can arguably regulate GHGs via the NAAQS in
a common-sense manner that puts a cap on aggregate emissions.
This section will discuss how the EPA can establish state emission
budgets to meet or maintain the NAAQS, where the EPA should set
the NAAQS, and how states can achieve the NAAQS, including
opting into an EPA-created cap and trade program.
A. Addressing the Global Nature of GHGs and Assigning State
Budgets
Typically, the NAAQS provisions require the EPA to set a
concentration level of a given pollutant, and if a region is above
the concentration then that area is in nonattainment of the NAAQS.
Conversely, if the area is below the NAAQS, then that area is in
attainment. However, since GHGs are global pollutants, emissions
in one location will affect the concentration everywhere. It is for this
reason that many argue against using the NAAQS to address GHGs;
a region or state will be unable to directly control the concentration of
GHGs in the ambient air even if it drastically reduced its emissions.
Views to Accompany S. 4358, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. at 9 (Sept. 17, 1970), at 9
(emphasis added). It is arguable, therefore, that subsection (C) was meant to be
a separate category for which EPA could list pollutants as criteria, and if a given
pollutant met subsections (A) and (B) then the EPA must issue criteria, or if the
Administrator planned to issue air quality criteria under subsection (C) then the
EPA could also list the pollutants. See McCubbin, supra at 457-460.
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However, the Clean Air Act includes the necessary tools to
take into consideration the global nature of GHGs. In this regard,
states are granted relief from the CAA if the reason they are in
nonattainment is due to international emissions. Section 179B allows
states to submit to the EPA that they would be in attainment of the
NAAQS "but for emissions emanating from outside of the United
States." 99 While in the past, states would need to apply to the EPA
for relief pursuant to 179B if the state was not in compliance with
the NAAQS due to international emissions,"oo it is arguable that the
EPA could determine that 179B should be applicable on a national
basis and determine that the nation would be in compliance with
the NAAQS but for international emissions."o0 Accordingly, the EPA
may be given leeway to regulate in such a manner that the entire
country may be in attainment of the NAAQS "but for" international
emissions.102 Indeed, the CAA recognizes, by the terms of 179B,
that international emissions will contribute to concentration levels
within the United States, and such a scenario does not render the
states in noncompliance or the NAAQS provisions inapplicable.
By utilizing section 179B, the EPA would be allowed, in
effect, to ignore international emissions and focus exclusively
on domestic emissions when deeming a SIP to be in compliance.
Thus, while the terms of the NAAQS provisions nevertheless
require the EPA to set a concentration of GHGs in the ambient air
that protects health and welfare, since the EPA would be allowed
to ignore international emissions, it would accordingly be improper
to test the physical concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere since
the concentration of GHGs in any state would include emissions
emanating from outside that state.
9942 U.S.C. § 7509(a)(2013).
1oo Only California's Imperial Valley, which borders Mexico, has previously in-
voked 179B. California redesignated Imperial Valley and the resignation request
was approved and published by the EPA. 66 Fed. Reg. 42125, 42127.
"0 The EPA noted in the ANPR that they are considering the role 179B may play
in providing relief to states. See ANPR, supra at 44,481; see also William L. Ko-
vacs, Chamber of Commerce of U.S. (2006).
102ANPR, supra note 12, at 44,481.
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After the EPA sets the appropriate concentration of the
NAAQS to protect health and welfare, which will be discussed in
greater detail in the following subsection, the EPA could determine
the amount the entire world must reduce its emissions to meet or
maintain the target concentration, determine the United States
contribution to worldwide GHG emissions, and set a national budget
of emissions which reduce business as usual emissions by the same
percentage that must be reduced worldwide. Accordingly, the
United States could establish a national budget of emissions in order
to meet the required NAAQS concentration "but for" international
emissions.
After determining the national budget of emissions, the EPA
could then assign each individual state a budget. Indeed, there is
precedent for the EPA assigning budgets through the "good neighbor"
provision, section 110(a)(2)(D), which prohibits interference with
attainment of the NAAQS by other states.103 To address pollution
caused by nitrous oxide emissions, the EPA issued the "NOx SIP
Call," which created a model cap and trade program and assigned
states corresponding budgets for the power sector and a few other
industrial categories. 104 The EPA created another cap and trade
program pursuant to the "good neighbor" provision, which likewise
assigned budgets to states, with the Clean Air Interstate Rule
(CAIR), which addressed both NOx and sulfur dioxide emissions
from 28 states.o10 Both of these rules were challenged in court and
the outcomes shed light on how the EPA should assign budgets for
GHGs. In this regard, the EPA should require each state to reduce
10 Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the
Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Transport
of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51,
72, 75, and 96); Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and
Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule); Revisions to the Acid Rain Program; Revisions
to the NOx SIP Call, 70 Fed. Reg.25, 162 (May 12, 2005) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, and 96).
.o.NOx SIP Call, supra. Significantly, all of the states that were affected by the
EPA regulations adopted EPA's model rule. Richardson (2010), supra at 12.
15 Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone
(CAIR); Revisions to the Acid Rain Program; Revisions to the NOx SIP Call, 70
Fed. Reg. 25,162 (2005).
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emissions by a certain percentage while taking into consideration
each state's current contribution to GHG concentrations. The EPA
could arguably give credit to states that have already implemented
regulations and practices that reduce emissions so that states that
have taken the initiative to reduce GHGs before being mandated to
would not be penalized.
B. Where to Set the NAAQS
Determining the level to set the NAAQS is a major concern
of regulating GHGs through the NAAQS provisions. The NAAQS
is set at a concentration which protects health and welfare with an
"adequate margin of safety," and may be expressed as parts per
million (ppm) by volume. If the EPA decides to list GHGs as a
criteria pollutant, or is forced to through litigation due to its prior
"endangerment finding" with respect to motor vehicles, the EPA
must simultaneously "publish...proposed national primary and
secondary ambient air quality standards" for GHGs.10 6 The primary
standards must be set at a level which protects "public health" with
an "adequate margin of safety," 10 and the secondary standards are
set at a level "requisite to protect the public welfare from any known
or anticipated adverse effects... "" Currently, the C02 concentration
in the atmosphere is approximately 393 ppm, and is increasing by 1
to 2 ppm per year.109 Many disagree over the appropriate or "safe"
concentration of GHGs, and it is predicted that should the EPA issue
NAAQS for GHGs, this subject will be litigated. However, as will
be discussed in greater detail below, the EPA may rely on scientific
studies to decide an appropriate NAAQS that will likely be given
deference and upheld by the courts.
An important issue will be whether the EPA sets NAAQS for
all GHGs, or separate NAAQS for each GHG individually. There
106 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2).
10 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
10842 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2).
'
9 See NOAA's Annual Greenhouse Gas Index, available at http://www.esrl.noaa.
gov/gmd/aggi/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2013); see also LARRY PARKER & JAIEs E.
MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40585, 8, CLIMATE CHANGE: POTENTIAL REGU-
LATION OF STATIONARY GREENHOUSE GAS SOURCES UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT (2009).
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are six gases that are considered GHGs; carbon dioxide, methane,
nitrous oxide, hydroflurocarbons, perflurocarbons and sulfur
hexafluoride.110 The EPAhas begun regulating GHGs as a single class
of pollutants."' Additionally, the EPA already established reporting
inventories for emissions and sinks based on a C02-equivalent
basis.112 Accordingly, it would follow that the NAAQS should be
set for all GHGs as a single class, determining the concentration
on a C02 equivalency basis. If GHGs were in a single class, it
would have the added benefit of allowing broad trading between
various sectors. As stated above, the current C02 concentration is
approximately 393 ppm, but the current C02-equivalency (C02-e)
of all GHGs is approximately 476 ppm. 113 For the sake of ease of
argument, henceforth this paper will assume that non-C02 GHGs
add approximately 80 ppm to the total concentration of GHGs.
In the ANPR, the EPA argued that determining the level of
NAAQS for GHGs is not only difficult due to many uncertainties,
including complex feedback loops, but also it is not purely a scientific
question; rather it "involves important value judgments regarding
what level of climate change may or may not be acceptable."11 4
Indeed, many argue that Congress should determine the level that
NAAQS should be set at due to the political nature of the question.1I
In this regard, by setting the NAAQS at a certain level, the EPA
would be, in effect, determining the United States' position as to the
goal for GHG concentrations worldwide. Such a determination in the
hands of a single executive agency may have political implications
both domestically and internationally.
no See Tailoring Rule, supra note 6 at 31518.
"' See id.
112 See generally EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks:
1990-2011, EPA 430-R-13-001 (Apr. 12, 2013).
113 See NOAA's Annual Greenhouse Gas Index, available at http://www.esrl.noaa.
gov/gmd/ aggi/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2013).
"
4 ANPR, supra note 12, at 44367, 44401; see also McCubbin, supra note 70 at
111.
"1 See Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, OfBabies and Bathwater: Why
the Clean AirAct s Cooperative Federalism Framework is Usefulfor Addressing
Global Warming, 50 ARIz. L. REv. 799, 822 (2008).
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While it will be difficult for the EPA to set NAAQS for
GHGs, it is surely not impossible.H6 Indeed, the CAA requires many
difficult tasks from the EPA, and the courts expect the EPA to arrive
at standards through tough scientific inquiries."' A major concern is
that the EPA cannot consider costs in setting the NAAQS. Pursuant to
the Supreme Court decision in Whitman v. American TruckingAssoc.,
Inc.,"' the EPA is forbidden to consider costs when determining the
level to set the NAAQS to. Since there is arguably no "safe" level to
set the NAAQS for GHGs while allowing continued emissions, as
any GHG concentration above pre-industrial levels could result in
adverse consequences, a strict reading of American Trucking would
require the complete shutdown of entire industries.119
Although the Supreme Court stated that the EPA may not
consider costs in arriving at the NAAQS standards for any given
pollutant, 12 0 it is a not-so-hidden secret that the EPA can, and does,
consider costs and other factors when arriving at the standards.
In this regard, a requirement on the EPA to demand risk-free air
quality, without regard to costs, assumes that there is a "safe"
concentration or threshold for any given pollutant.12 1 Not only is
this not accurate for GHGs, but it is also not true for most, if not
all, conventional pollutants.122 Indeed, virtually all conventional
pollutants are non-threshold pollutants, meaning that any emissions
above zero are potentially harmful.123 Accordingly, if the EPA were
actually required to set NAAQS at a level that guaranteed absolutely
no harm, then NAAQS for currently-listed criteria pollutants would
"
6 See McCubbin, supra note 98 at 460 (" [W]hether greenhouse gases and their
long-term impacts are so completely different from conventional pollutants that
the task is not merely difficult but unworkable remains unclear.").
"'See, e.g., Lead Indus. Assoc., Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1160-1161 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (upholding EPA's national standards for lead even though "the issues in-
volved are at the 'very frontiers of scientific knowledge."'); see generally Giovin-
azzo, supra note 40.
118531 U.S. 457 (2001).
"
9 See McCubbin, supra note 70 at 114.
120 See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468.
12 1 See Giovinazzo, supra note 40 at 104.
122 Id. at 105.
123 See id.
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need to be set at a level that would cause nearly all production,
transportation, and electric generation to come to a halt. Indeed, even
in the American Trucking case, which was in regards to the NAAQS
revisions for particulate matter (PM) and ozone, the EPA did not
set the NAAQS at the absolute safest level. Rather, the EPA's own
studies demonstrated that had the NAAQS been stricter, it would
produce significant health benefits. 124 Yet, on remand to the D.C.
Circuit, the court approved the EPA's standards for PM and ozone,125
despite the Supreme Court's instructions that cost could not be a
factor, and the EPA's own studies demonstrated that there were safer
levels at which the NAAQS could have been set.
Justice Breyer's concurrence in American Trucking sheds
light on how the EPA can move forward in setting NAAQS for non-
threshold pollutants, including GHGs. Justice Breyer stated:
"Nor are the words 'requisite' and 'public health' to
be understood independent of context. We consider
football equipment 'safe' even if it entails a level
of risk that would make drinking water 'unsafe'
for consumption. And what counts as 'requisite' to
protecting the public health will similarly vary with
background circumstances, such as the public's
ordinary tolerance of the particular risk in the
particular context at issue."l 26
Justice Breyer's opinion clarifies that the EPA need not set
the NAAQS at a level that is absolutely risk free, and given the
"context" of climate change, the EPA can likely set the NAAQS at a
level that protects against dangerous climate change while ensuring
economic development does not come to a halt.12 7
124 1d. at 111.
125 Am. Trucking Assoc., Inc. v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also
Giovinazzo, supra note 40 at 107.
126 See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 494.
127 See Giovinazzo, supra note 40, at 110 ("Justice Breyer's invocation of context
is really just a euphemism for cost.").
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In setting the NAAQS, the EPA would likely need to
determine whether it must consider the health and welfare impacts
of international populations or just domestic populations. Arguably,
pursuant to section 115 of the CAA, a NAAQS would need to take
into consideration international harms. That section requires the
Administrator to issue a SIP call when a state's emissions endanger
the health and welfare of international populations.128 Since it is likely
that climate change will have greater impacts on certain international
populations then domestic populations, if the EPA is forced to take
into consideration the health and welfare of these populations as
well, the NAAQS may be significantly more stringent then it would
be if only national populations were considered.1 29 Accordingly, it
will be of great importance for the EPA to determine whether or not
international populations should be considered.
When the EPA undertakes to set the NAAQS levels, it must
establish a Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC)
for GHGs.13 0 The CASAC and the EPA would then develop a
recommended range for NAAQS options, of which the EPA
Administrator will ultimately choose the NAAQS standard.13 1 As
discussed above, the primary NAAQS are set at a level that protects
the public health "with an adequate margin of safety," and the
secondary NAAQS protects welfare from adverse effects. Where to
set the NAAQS will likely be a complex and contentious issue,132
though the EPA will have discretion on where to set the NAAQS
as long as it is based on adequate science. The EPA could rely on
existing synthesis reports, such as that by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), to expedite the process.133
128 42 U.S.C. § 7415.
129 Section 115 only directs the EPA to issue SIP calls to prevent international
pollution if the harmed nation gives "essentially the same rights with respect to
the prevention or control of air pollution occurring in that country" as the United
States gives. See 42 U.S.C. § 7415(c).
13042 U.S.C. § 7408(b)(1).
131 See, e.g., National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73 Fed. Reg.
16,436, 16,477-78 (Mar. 27, 2008).
132 Some argue Congress should address the question. See Doremus & Hanemann,
supra note 115, at 822.
133 ANPR, supra note 12, at 44483.
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The EPA may set the NAAQ S above the current concentration
of GHGs, which is approximately 393 ppm of C02 and 476 ppm
C02-e. Indeed, the IPCC found that in order to avoid "dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system" concentrations
of GHGs should not exceed 450 ppm, or 530 ppm C02-e. 13 4 The
EPA may choose to adopt the 530 ppm C02-e as a reference point in
setting the NAAQS. If the NAAQS are set at a level above current
concentrations, PSD rules would be triggered, which are less
burdensome than if the country was in nonattainment. 13 5 Moreover,
as discussed above, the EPA has already begun initiating PSD rules,
even though NAAQS have not been issued for GHGs.
However, the EPA may decide that 530 ppm C02-e is too
high of a concentration to protect public health and welfare. Indeed,
a 530 ppm C02-e, or 450 ppm of C02, concentration may result in a
50% chance of exceeding a two degree Celsius rise and a 30% chance
of exceeding a three degree rise. 13 6 Such a threat of temperature
increases may be too severe to protect health and welfare "with an
adequate margin of safety." In this regard, some, including NASA
climatologist Dr. James Hansen, argue that the concentration of
GHGs in the atmosphere is already too high, and a proper level for
the NAAQS should be 350 ppm of C02, or 420 ppm of C02-e. 137
Ifthe NAAQ S are set below current levels then nonattainment
NSR rules would be triggered. New and modified sources would
need to install the most sophisticated technologies that achieve the
"lowest achievable emissions rate."1 38 Additionally, new or modified
sources would be required to offset their emissions by reductions
in emissions from other sources in the same nonattainment area
or contributing upwind nonattainment area. 139 If these offset
rules were to apply, however, the nature of GHGs may allow for
134 PCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE, at § 5 (2007).
135 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7475, with 42 U.S.C. § 7503.
136 AMY L. LUERS ET AL., How To AVOID DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE: A TARGET FOR
U.S. EMISSIONS, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (2007), available at http:// www.
ucsusa.org/assets/documents/global wanning/emissions-target-report.pdf.
17 Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric C02: Where Should Humanity Aim?, 2 THE
OPEN ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217, 229 (2008).
38 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (a)(2).
19 42 U.S.C. § 7503(c).
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increased flexibility for compliance when compared with traditional
pollutants. While the offset provisions in regards to nonattainment
NSR has not applied in a nationwide manner in the past, GHGs are
substantially different than traditional pollutants due to their global
nature. In this regard, every state in the nation could be considered
an "upwind" state to any other state, since emissions anywhere in
the nation increases the concentrations of GHGs everywhere else.
Accordingly, the new or modified source could offset its emissions
through reductions anywhere in the country.
C. Primary vs. Secondary NAAQS
When areas are designated in nonattainment, the SIPs must
provide for reaching attainment for the primary NAAQS no later
than five years from the date of the nonattainment designation, 140
or no later than ten years if the EPA decides that the state needs
additional time. 14 1 Such a time frame may be unreasonable for
GHGs, which have long atmospheric residence times. The EPA may,
however, have the flexibility to only issue secondary NAAQS for
GHGs. 142 Rather than a strict ten-year time frame, the CAA provides
that areas in nonattainment must meet the secondary NAAQS "as
expeditiously as practicable.. "143 The EPA likely has the discretion
to define "as expeditiously as practicable" in a manner that provides
states the time needed to meet the NAAQS. Accordingly, there will
be greater flexibility if only the secondary NAAQS applied, rather
than the primary and the secondary.
While the EPA typically issues both primary and secondary
NAAQS, it may have discretion to only issue secondary NAAQS
for GHGs. As mentioned previously, primary NAAQS protect
public health and secondary NAAQS protect welfare. In the past,
the EPA has never set only a secondary NAAQS for a given criteria
pollutant. However, traditional pollutants have direct impacts on
health, whereas GHGs only have indirect health impacts. Moreover,
14o42 U.S.C. § 7410(n)(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(2)(A).
'"'42 U.S.C. § 7502 (a)(2)(A).
142 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2).
142 U.S.C. § 7502 (a)(2)(B).
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there is precedent for issuing NAAQS for only one of the two
categories. In this regard, there is only a primary NAAQS for carbon
monoxide, since there are no known or anticipated adverse welfare
effects associated with the pollutant. 144
The definition of "welfare" in the CAA includes "effects
on... weather...and climate..."145 Significantly, the EPA has found
that all of the health effects of GHGs are caused by changes in the
weather and the climate. The EPA stated:
"Current and projected levels of ambient
concentrations of the six GHGs are not expected
to cause any direct adverse health effects, such as
respiratory or toxic effects, which would occur as a
result of the elevated GHG concentrations themselves
rather than through climate change. However, there
are indirect human health risks (e.g., heat related
mortality, exacerbated air quality, extreme events)...
[T]he health impacts associated with ambient GHG
concentrations are a result of the changes in climate
at the global, regional, and local levels, which trigger
myriad ecological and metrological changes that can
adversely affect public health... The effects on human
health are thus indirect impacts resulting from these
ecological and meteorological changes, which are
effects on welfare."1 46
The EPA may argue that any health-based effects caused by
changes in the weather and/or climate, such as increases in rates
of heat stroke, are encompassed within the CANs definition of
welfare. Otherwise, "health" and "welfare" would be overlapping,
and would cause language in the CAA to become surplusage.
... National Ambient Air Quality Standards, EPA, available at http://www.epa.
gov/air/criteria.html; see also 76 Fed. Reg. 54,294 (Aug. 31, 2011) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 53, 58). In 1985, the EPA revoked the secondary NAAQS for
carbon monoxide. 50 Fed. Reg. 37484, 37494 (Sept. 13, 1985) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 50).
.542 U.S.C. § 7602 (h).
146ANPR, supra note 12, at 44427, 44478.
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Moreover, the CAA commands the EPA to issue NAAQS for those
pollutants that cause or contribute to air pollution that endangers
"public health or welfare."l 47 Thus, the drafters understood that there
might be occasions where pollutants cause health effects, but are
not detrimental to welfare, and vice versa. The EPA may therefore
argue that primary NAAQS only apply to direct health effects from
pollutants and indirect health effects from changes in the weather
and climate are considered in setting the secondary NAAQS.
Accordingly, health-based effects caused by changes in the weather
or climate could arguably be addressed by secondary NAAQS rather
than primary NAAQS. Therefore, the EPA may argue that it can
issue only secondary NAAQS for GHGs, rather than primary and
secondary, thus allowing greater flexibility for states to come into
compliance should the nation be deemed to be in nonattainment,
rather than a stringent 10-year deadline to come into compliance.
D. State Implementation Plans (SIPs) and a Model Cap and
Trade
Pursuant to section 110 of the CAA, after the EPA assigns
a NAAQS for a given pollutant, the states must then submit state
implementation plans (SIPs) which detail the steps the state will
take to meet and maintain the NAAQS. As discussed above, given
the global nature of GHGs, the EPA could arguably assign each
state a budget of GHGs and, accordingly, if the state remains under
its budget then it will be in compliance. Moreover, as discussed
above, if the EPA is allowed to only assign a secondary NAAQS
for GHGs, then the states and the EPA will not need to meet the
NAAQS-required concentration in the strict 10-year time frame
that must be met for the primary NAAQS; rather states must meet
the standards as "expeditiously as possible." Accordingly, the EPA
could arguably assign state budgets which will allow the country to
meet the NAAQS concentration "as expeditiously as possible" "but
for" international emissions.
A NAAQS program could likely incorporate flexible
market-based mechanisms including a cap and trade. Unlike NSPS
142 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
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provisions, discussed above, which generally govern technology-
based facility emission reductions, NAAQS is focused on
atmospheric concentrations, and thus the flexibility of compliance
mechanisms is much broader. Indeed, section 110 allows SIPs to
include "economic incentives such as fees, marketable permits and
auctions emissions rights" to meet and maintain the NAAQS. 14 8
Accordingly, states could create trading programs or opt into an
EPA-created program. A state may choose to opt into the EPA plan
or devise its own SIP, subject to EPA approval, that demonstrates a
sufficient reduction in emissions and is consistent with the standards
set by the EPA. 149 If the state does not establish a satisfactory SIP, the
EPA can order a federal implementation plan (FIP) for that state. 150
After assigning budgets, the EPA may create a cap and trade
system for certain sectors of the economy. The EPA has in the past
established cap and trade programs pursuant to the "good neighbor
provision" in the NAAQS section."'1 While these programs, the NOx
SIP Calll52 and the Clean Air Interstate Rule,153 were more limited
in scope as they were not nationwide and only applied to certain
sectors, these programs demonstrate that the EPA has the authority
to establish cap and trade programs via the NAAQS provisions.
Such a NAAQS trading program for GHGs could be much broader
and allow trading across sectors, rather than be limited to single
categories of sources as would be the case for a program through the
NSPS provisions. While the EPA arguably has the authority to create
an economy-wide cap and trade program, it would likely choose
to apply the program to the sectors it already regulates, such as
electrical generation and other large industries. Pursuant to an EPA-
modeled cap and trade program, a portion of the state's emissions
14842 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A).
See Richardson (2010), supra note 39, at 9- 10.
15o42 U.S.C. § 7410(c).
'5'42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D).
152 EPA, Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in
the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Trans-
port of Ozone (the "NOx SIP Call").
153 Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone
(CAIR), 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51,
72-74, 77, 78, 96).
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budget would be allocated towards the program, and, depending
on a state's individual budget and how many of its emissions come
from the sectors that are covered in the cap and trade program, some
states may be required to reduce emissions from other sectors as
well. The states would be granted broad leeway in its decisions on
how to reduce emissions further. Indeed, the CAA gives states great
flexibility in meeting the NAAQS.15 4 This would create a multi-
faceted approach, which many scholars believe is the best way to
address GHGs. "I
A national multi-sector, rather than an economy-wide, cap
and trade system may be preferable for GHGs, especially in the
context of regulation by the EPA. Indeed, the EPAexpressed concerns
regarding an economy-wide cap and trade market created by the
EPA due to the high administrative costs for measuring, reporting
and verifying, and due to the infeasibility of accurate monitoring
and compliance for various sectors of the economy that the EPA
has traditionally not governed. 156 The EPA has already implemented
multi-sector cap and trade approaches under CAAprograms, whereas
"[a]n economy-wide, market-oriented environmental regulation has
"I Thomas D. Peterson, Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., & John C. Dernbach, Develop-
ing a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change Policy in the United States
that Fully Integrates Levels of Government and Economic Sectors, 26 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 227, 256 (2008).
1' Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism Proposal for Climate Legislation:
The Value ofStateAutonomy in a Federal System, 85:4 DENV. U. L. REV. 791, 834
(2008) ("Although some policymakers appear to presume that a cap-and-trade
program will be a sufficient solution, a more multi-faceted approach is neces-
sary."); Peterson et al., supra note 154, at 250 ("To be effective, a tax or cap-and-
trade mechanism, or both, should be a part of the mix, but other measures will
be also required and must be integrated with the cap-and-trade program and with
each other."); Doremus et al, supra note 115, at 800 ("We have no quarrel with the
idea that cap-and-trade strategies should play a role in addressing greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions - trading is a politically palatable and cost-effective way to ad-
dress some of the 'low-hanging fruit' of GHG emissions. But enthusiasm for trad-
ing has become so pervasive that it threatens to drive out interest for other policy
instruments. We do have a quarrel with this."); Nordhaus, supra note 11, at 58
(Such a hybrid approach would "build upon existing sector-based approaches.").
156 ANPR, supra note 12, at 44,411.
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never been implemented before in the U.S."' As the EPA stated,
"...it may be simpler and thus faster to move forward with cap-and-
trade programs for sectors already involved in, and thus familiar
with, cap-and-trade programs."1ss
If the country is deemed to be in nonattainment of the
NAAQS, the EPA can rely on the "good neighbor" provision to
create the model cap and trade program. The EPA already created
two cap and trade programs under the "good neighbor" provision,
section 110(a)(2)(D), which prohibits interference with attainment
of the NAAQS by other states.159 To address pollution caused by
nitrous oxide emissions, the EPA issued a NOx SIP Call, which
created a model cap and trade program for the power sector and a
few other industrial categories.160 Significantly, all of the states that
were affected by the EPA regulations adopted EPA's model rule.16 1
The NOx SIP rule was challenged in Michigan v. EPA,162 but the
rules were upheld by the Court of Appeals of the D.C. Circuit.163
The EPA created another cap and trade program pursuant to
the "good neighbor" provision with the Clean Air Interstate Rule
(CAIR), which addressed both NOx and sulfur dioxide emissions
from 28 states. 16 4 The D.C. Circuit, however, invalidated CAIR and
held that the trading program failed to guarantee that emissions
from upwind states would not "contribute significantly" to the
nonattainment of the NAAQS in downwind states, as required by
1571Id. at 44, 374.
15 Id. at 44,412.
1 Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the
Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Transport
of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998) (hereinafter "NOx SIP Call") (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 75 & 96); Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport
of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (CAIR); Revisions to the Acid Rain Pro-
gram; Revisions to the NOx SIP Call, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R pts. 51,72,73,74,77,78 & 96).
160NOx SIP Call, supra note 159.
161 Richardson (2010), supra note 39, at 12; see NOx SIP Call, supra note 159.
162 213 F.3d 633 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
163 However, the cap-and-trade program itself was not challenged by the petition-
ers. See id.
16470 Fed. Reg. at 25,162.
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110(a)(2)(D).165 The decision by the D.C. Circuit in North Carolina
v. EPA will likely be inapplicable to a GHG trading program.
Since GHGs are well-mixed global pollutants, emission reductions
anywhere will affect local concentrations as much as they affect
concentrations in any other part of the country. Accordingly each
state is an "upwind" state and a "downwind" state to every other
state. In North Carolina v. EPA, the Court was concerned that upwind
states could purchase allowances rather than reducing emissions,
and, thus the trading program would not address a downwind state's
nonattainment of the NAAQS.166 For a GHG trading program, on
the other hand, states will not run into the same problem that the
D.C. Circuit was concerned with. With respect to GHGs, even if
sources in a state do not reduce emissions, but rather purchases
allowances, the emission reductions will still occur from a different
state, thereby reducing the overall concentration of GHGs in each
state.167 Thus, the problem with CATR would not be applicable to
GHGs, and a GHG cap and trade program would not run afoul of
section 11 0(a)(2)(D).
Even if the NAAQS are set at a level above the current
concentration, the EPA nevertheless can arguably establish a cap and
trade program. In this regard, as suggested in the ANPR, the EPA
could argue that in order to maintain the NAAQS, the states need
to reduce current emissions by a certain amount, since business as
usual would lead to nonattainment of the NAAQS. 168 Accordingly,
the model SIPs that contain the cap and trade program is necessary
to maintain the NAAQS.
Depending on where the EPA sets the NAAQS and the
amount of reductions from the sectors involved in the cap and trade
program, states may need to reduce emissions beyond the program.
Since motor vehicles subject to Title II and stationary sources subject
to NSPS would be compelled to reduce emissions even with a
NAAQS program, states can consider these reductions in their SIPs.
'
65North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir.), modified on reh'g in part, 550
F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
166 531 F.3d at 907; see generally McCubbin, supra note 70.
167 See Richardson (2010), supra note 33, at 12, fn 33.
168 See ANPR, supra note 12, at 44,482.
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Additionally, states could create their own initiatives, or even use
existing policies and programs, to satisfy their emissions reductions
quota. Indeed, the states are in a good position to address their own
interests to decide how to reduce emissions.169 The structure of the
SIP process itself is meant to give states autonomy to implement
their own mechanisms to address environmental concerns.170
This cooperative federalism approach is exactly how the
SIP structure is supposed to be implemented, wherein the federal
government sets the environmental goal (the NAAQS), and allows
the states broad authority for implementation.171 As one commentator
noted:
...in many ways the state planning and
implementation framework used to achieve the
NAAQS is an excellent fit for addressing global
warming. It can engage the states as full partners in
addressing the problem, leverage the work they are
already doing, provide information needed to tackle
aspects of the problem that are not well suited to
markets, recognize local variation in challenges and
opportunities, take advantage of the special political
and practical abilities of the states to deal with
behavioral emissions, and help states learn from one
'
69 See Doremus et al., supra note 115, at 800 ("The states are in a better position
than either the federal government or the market to address the individual behav-
iors responsible for a large proportion of the nation's GHG emissions; indeed,
many states are already taking steps to do so.").
1o See Kaswan, supra note 155, at 821. Alice Kaswan supported new federal leg-
islation which implemented a SIP-like process, and stated, "Since federal emis-
sion reduction goals are unlikely to be achievable solely through direct source
regulation and/or a cap-and-trade program, and are likely to require state and local
action, then some mechanism, like state implementation plans, will be necessary
to stimulate the necessary state and local action and to determine how regulatory
actions to multiple levels will ultimately achieve federal goals." Id. at 829-830.
1' See Doremus et al., supra note 115, at 817 ("The Clean Air Act was the first
modem federal environmental statute to employ a 'cooperative federalism frame-
work,' assigning responsibilities for air pollution control to both federal and state
authorities.").
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another's successes and failures."1 72
State programs that address GHGs beyond the cap and trade
program can be in those sectors traditionally under state control, for
example land use, building codes and agriculture. Indeed, it would
be difficult to include these sectors into a cap and trade program, due
to difficulty in monitoring and verifying emissions reductions. 173
For example, a state may include in its SIP land use changes that
would reduce the amount of miles driven in a given city or a
program to incentivize reforestation. While such reductions would
likely be incompatible with a cap and trade program, the state could
demonstrate to the EPA that such programs would lead to emission
reductions within the state. 174
As long as the emissions reductions can be demonstrated to
the EPA, the states will be granted a broad range of discretion in
choosing the policy options to be implemented. Such a system to
address climate change would allow the states to be creative and act
as "laboratories" of innovation. Indeed, the state may use various
regulatory approaches such as direct regulation or market-based
programs to address its own needs. As noted by one commentator,
"Allowing state experimentation is particularly appropriate where
the problem to be addressed is new and where policymakers are
uncertain about the best mechanisms for addressing it."17 ' Giving
states a great deal offlexibility to innovate will result in states learning
from each other and create opportunities for collaboration. 176
1721d. at 823.
173 See, e.g., Kaswan, supra note 155, at 835-36; Doremus et al., supra note 115,
at 816; Kassie Siegel, Bill Snape, & Matt Vespa, No Reason to Wait: Reducing
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Through the CleanAirAct, Center for Biological Di-
versity, 6 (2009).
1'See Kaswan, supra note 155, at 836 ("Reducing vehicle miles traveled through
smart growth requirements and improved public transit is likely to be an essential
component of an effective climate change policy, and one that cannot be accom-
plished through a cap-and-trade program.").
17Id. at 800.
176 Siegel et al., supra note 72, at 18.
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Many states are already seriously addressing climate change
with laws differing greatly state-to-state."' One study has found
that states have undertaken over 250 different types of policy
actions to mitigate climate change."' The federal government
should capitalize on this momentum.17 9 For example, a nine-state
coalition in the northeast participates in the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (RGGI) and California has initiated its own cap and
trade program, both of which include offsets." Twenty-nine states
and Washington D.C. have laws regarding renewable portfolio
standards (RPS) or end-use-efficiency."' Such programs vary, but in
general, RPS programs mandate or incentivize electricity generation
from renewable sources and end-use-efficiency programs reduce
the overall demand on electricity generation. These programs
allow states to achieve reductions at a lower cost than traditional
measures.18 2 A NAAQS program would likely be able to take
advantage of existing state programs since the focus of NAAQS
can be on overall emissions rather than source-specific reductions.
For example, the EPA already allows states to use RPS and end-use
efficiency programs to meet NAAQS with regards to other criteria
pollutants, and the EPA issued a guidance document that provides
"'See Kaswan, supra note 155, at 794; Peterson et al., supra note 154, at 236; JR.
DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form ofFederal Regulation: The Case of
Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1499 (2007).
7"Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. & Thomas D. Peterson, The Implications of the New
'Old' Federalism in Climate-Change Legislation: How to Function in a Global
Marketplace When States Take the Lead, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV.
L.J. 61, 72 (2007).
"7 Of note, none of the federal bills considered in Congress contained provisions
that would allow states to incorporate existing programs into the programs. See
Kaswan, supra note 155, at 815-816.
1soSee Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: C02 Offsets, available at http://www.
rggi.org/ market/offsets; California Air Resources Board ' Process for the Re-
view and Approval of Compliance Offset Protocols in Support of the Cap-and-
Trade Regulation, CARB (May 2013), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/
capandtrade/compliance-offset-protocol-process.pdf.
"I Monast et al., supra note 44, at 10,209.
182 EPA, Roadmap for Incorporating Enegy Efficiency/Renewable Energy Policies
and Programs into State and Tribal Implementation Plans, (July 2012), available
at http://www.epa.gov/eere/pdfs/EEREmanual.pdf.
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a roadmap to assist states in accounting for and incorporating RPS
and energy efficiency policies into SIPs. 183
A NAAQS program, unlike an NSPS-only program, would
incentivize states to address emissions other than those from
large stationary sources. Even if the EPA incorporated most large
stationary sources into an NSPS program, a significant portion of
GHGs-almost 50%-would remain outside of the program. 18 4
Indeed, land use changes, building standards, and most agricultural
operations are completely outside the scope ofNSPS.115 Furthermore,
low priced-methods to sequester carbon through reforestation and
agricultural soil sequestration would not be incentivized under
an NSPS program.186 As the EPA stated, "A NAQQS would call
for assessment of potential control strategies for a broad array of
sources, rather than focusing only on emissions reduction from a
specified (but potentially limited) list of sources."1"'
Nearly half of all domestic GHG emissions occur from the
commercial and residential buildings, transportation and agriculture
sectors. While mobile sources are regulated under Title Il of the CAA,
states may be able to further reduce emissions from the transportation
sector to comply with a NAAQS by incorporating land-use changes
or other programs that decrease the amount of miles driven into a state
implementation plan. For example, Washing D.C.'s city-wide bike-
sharing program reduced carbon dioxide emissions by an estimated
3.7 million pounds per year." Moreover, there are numerous
agricultural techniques that could be used domestically that reduce
emissions and remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, including
manure management techniques, precision fertilization, no-tillage
183 See id.
"I Nordhaus, supra note 11, at 69.
'
5Richardson (2011), supra note 11, at 17; 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (b)(1)(A); see also
42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (stating that NSP only covers large stationary sources of
emissions).
186 Richardson (2011), supra note 11, at 27.
1 ANPR, supra note 12, at 4485.
18 Tanya Snyder, Capital Bikeshare Members Reduced their Driving 4.4 Mil-
lion Miles Per Year, DC STREETS BLOG (May 22, 2013), http://dc.streetsblog.
org/2013/05/22/capital-bikeshare-members-reduced-their-driving-4-4-million-
miles-per-year/.
TURNING LEMONS INTO LEMONADE
or low-tillage farming, and agroforestry. Furthermore, policies that
incentivize efficient building designs could be incorporated into a
NAAQS implementation plan. While all of these programs may
assist in reducing overall concentrations, since the reductions do
not occur at a stationary source, they would be outside the scope
of NSPS. Lastly, sequestration projects, including reforestation
and agricultural sequestration, could theoretically be incorporated
into a SIP since they assist in lowering overall concentrations.18 9
Accordingly, states would be given broad leeway in creating an
array of programs that reduce emissions in order to comply with the
EPA-mandated budgets.
IV. CONCLUSION
The issue of climate change deserves a comprehensive federal
response. However, there has yet to be the necessary congressional
action. The EPA has broad authority through the Clean Air Act to
regulate greenhouse gases, and should move forward by issuing
a NAAQS for GHGs. Through the NAAQS, the EPA would have
the ability to regulate GHGs in a manner that incorporates flexible
market-based approaches, including a broad multi-sector cap and
trade program, takes advantage of existing state programs and covers
various sectors of the economy. While in an ideal world, Congress
would create a new statute that specifically addresses GHGs; such
a circumstance does not appear to be forthcoming. However, while
many believe that the CAA is not ideally suited for addressing
GHGs, the EPA certainly has the ability to use the CAA in a way
that makes sense for GHGs. As the old adage says: when life hands
you lemons, make lemonade.
While NAAQS regulations of GHGs may be politically
problematic, it should be noted that the EPA enjoys more public
support than Congress. Accordingly, it may be more likely for the
EPA, rather than Congress, to put in place the kind of comprehensive
regulatory approach that is needed to address GHG emissions. In
18 Such programs have a much greater potential for reductions internationally,
specifically in developing countries. Whether a SIP could incorporate interna-
tional reductions, for example through offsets, is outside the scope of this paper.
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this regard, according to a poll conducted in 2011, 75% of the public
trusts the EPA over Congress to determine air pollution limits.19 0 It
is likely true that NAAQS provisions will be subject to litigation.
Indeed, any regulation by the CAA concerning GHGs would likely
be challenged in Court, since it is a new area of rulemaking. Such
a concern, however, should not be the rationale that halts necessary
action to comprehensively address climate change. Indeed, NSPS
regulations, especially when attempting a broad trading regime, is
also subject to litigation, and as demonstrated above, may very well
fail. Indeed, litigation may result in the EPAbeing mandated to issue
a NAAQS for GHGs.
A NAAQS program can be sensible and rely on market-
based mechanisms. As discussed above, the EPA has the tools,
namely sections 179B and the "good neighbor" provision to issue
state budgets for GHGs. Moreover, if the EPA sets only a secondary
NAAQS, the EPA can design a program that allows states to come
into compliance "as expeditiously as possible" rather than within
a strict 10-year timeframe. To comply with the budgets, states
can then opt into a multi-sector cap and trade program to satisfy a
portion of the reductions necessary to meet their budgets and reduce
emissions even further through other sectors not covered by the cap
and trade program, such as building efficiency standards, land use,
reforestation, and agriculture. Accordingly, by issuing NAAQS for
GHGs, the EPA can ensure actual overall emission reductions in a
cost-effective, flexible and comprehensive manner.
190 Peyton Fleming, Voters Overwhelmingly Support EPA Air Pollution Rules,
CERES (Oct. 12, 2011), available at http://www.ceres.org/press/press-releases/
cleanairpoll.
